

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 SS-20

USIA-15 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 OIC-04 IO-14 AEC-11 SAM-01

OMB-01 DRC-01 /152 W

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R 011135Z JUN 74

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6066

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO USDEL MBFR VIENNA

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 3070

E.O. 11652: GDS, 12/31/82

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: TEXT OF IMS REPS MAY 30 HANDOUT IN SPC ON
MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF ADOPTING NEW FIGURES

REF: (A) USNATO 3021 (B) USNATO 3031

1. IN CONJUNCTION WITH HIS SPEAKING NOTE (TEXT REF A),
IMS REP (SMIGH) CIRCULATED AT MAY 30 SPC MEETING (AND
ON HIS OWN AUTHORITY) PRELIMINARY INFORMAL ANALYSIS OF
MILITARY IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO WHICH MIGHT RESULT IF
NEW FIGURES WERE ADOPTED IN NEGOTIATIONS AND IF CERTAIN
ELEMENTS OF NATO AIR FORCES WERE INCLUDED. TEXT OF PAPER
APPEARS BELOW.

2. BEGIN TEXT:

PRELIMINARY STAFF LEVEL CONSIDERATION OF THE POSSIBLE
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IMPLICATIONS OF NATO'S GROUND FORCE STRENGTHS AS IN
AC/276-D(74)5 AND OF ADOPTING AND DECLARING STRENGTHS
FOR CERTAIN ELEMENTS OF NATO AIR FORCES

1. IN ADOPTING THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT OF MBFR, THE ALLIES ENVISAGED APPLICATION TO GROUND FORCES ONLY IN THE NGA.

2. THIS INVOLVES, IN TERMS OF MANPOWER:

FIGURE OF OCT 73 NEW ASSESMENT AT 31.12.73

NATO 777,000	798,000
WP 925,000	927,000

3. THE CHANGE IN NUMBERS IS DUE PRIMARILY TO THE INCLUSION OF GE ARMY ELEMENTS EMPLOYED IN CENTRAL AND JOINT SERVICE ESTABLISHMENTS (20,000), OMITTED FROM THE COUNT OF OCT 73.

IMPLICATIONS FOR GROUND FORCES (IF THE COMMON CEILING AT 700,000 IS MAINTAINED)

4. NATO, IF THE COMMON CEILING AT 700,000 WERE MAINTAINED, WOULD HAVE TO REDUCE, IN NUMERICAL TERMS:

- A. FROM A TOTAL OF 798,000
- B. BY 21,000 MORE THAN ENVISAGED
- C. BY A PERCENTAGE OF 12.3 PCT
- D. IN THE FIRST (US/USSR) PHASE, THE US REDUCTIONS (OF 29,000) WOULD BE UNAFFECTED.

5. ASSUMING THERE WERE NO FURTHER US REDUCTIONS IN THE 2ND PHASE OF MBFR, THE CA, UK AND INDIGENOUS NATO FORCES WOULD BE REDUCED BY 21,000 MORE THAN PREVIOUSLY ENVISAGED (I.E. BY 69,000 OR 11.4 PCT).

THE EFFECTS IN DETAIL ARE DIFFICULT TO ASSESS IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY FIRM DECISION ON ALLOCATION OF REDUCTIONS/WITHDRAWALS AMONG NATO FORCES IN THE SECOND PHASE OF MBFR. CLEARLY, THE EXTRA REDUCTIONS COULD NOT BE BORNE TO ANY SIGNIFICANT EXTENT BY THE GE CENTRALISED/ SECRET

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JOINT ESTABLISHMENTS FROM WHICH THEY LARGELY DERIVE. THE EXTRA REDUCTIONS FOR THE INDIGENOUS FORCES, IF APPLIED ACROSS THE BOARD OF ARMY FORCES AMOUNT TO THE MANPOWER EQUIVALENT OF 3-4 BRIGADES (ABOUT ONE DIVISION),

ADDITIONAL TO ABOUT 48,000 (2-2 1/2 DIVISION MANPOWER EQUIVALENTS) PREVIOUSLY ENVISAGED FOR THE SECOND PHASE OF MBFR REDUCTIONS. THE WP FIGURES HAVE REMAINED SUBSTANTIALLY UNCHANGED (927,000 V. 925,000). THEREFORE, THE TOTAL NATO REDUCTIONS UNDER THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT WOULD BE LESS ASYMMETRIC THAN PREVIOUSLY ENVISAGED: THE RESIDUAL STANDING NATO PEACETIME FORCES INCLUDED IN THE 700,000 COULD, DEPENDING ON THE FORM OF REDUCTIONS

AND
THEIR ALLOCATION BETWEEN NATO NATIONS:

A. BE LOWER BY THE MANPOWER EQUIVALENT OF 3-4 BRIGADES (1 DIVISION)
THAN PREVIOUSLY ENVISAGED.

OR B. BE AT A LOWER STATE OF READINESS BECAUSE OF LOWER MANNING
LEVELS.

OR C. BE AFFECTED BY A COMBINATION OF A. AND B. ABOVE.

IMPLICATIONS FOR GROUND FORCES (IF THE COMMON CEILING WERE RAISED)

6. IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, THE AGREED LIMITATION OF REDUCTIONS
TO 10 PCT WERE APPLIED, THEN NATO WOULD HAVE TO REDUCE ARMY PERSONNEL
BY ABOUT 80,000 RATHER THAN BY ABOUT 77,000 - AN ADDITIONAL 3,000,
WITH
A COMMON CEILING AT ABOUT 720,000. THIS DIFFERENCE, RELATED TO THE
OBJECTIVE OF ATTAINING WITHDRAWAL OF A SOVIET TANK ARMY AND A COMMON
CEILING FOR NATO/PACT GROUND FORCES WOULD BE UNLIKELY TO BE
SIGNIFICANT.

INCLUSION OF AIR FORCES

7. THE AD HOC GROUP REQUIRE, FOR THEIR OWN INFORMATION:

A. THE NUMBERS OF AIR FORCE PERSONNEL FOR BOTH NATO AND WP
FORCES WHO CARRY OUT DUTIES UNDERTAKEN BY THE ARMY PERSONNEL OF
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CERTAIN NATIONS.

B. THE OVERALL NUMBERS OF AIR FORCE PERSONNEL IN THE NGA,
ON BOTH SIDES, BY COUNTRY.

THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE AD HOC GROUP MAY USE THIS INFORMATION IN
NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE EAST IS NOT YET DECIDED.

STRUCTURAL DIFFERENCES IN FORCES

8. THE IMMEDIATE PROBLEM DERIVES FROM E-W NEGOTIATIONS, ALREADY
STARTED, TO DEFINE "GROUND FORCES" IN THE CONTEXT OF THE ALLIED
CONCEPT OF
MBFR. THE ALLIES HAVE ALREADY ADMITTED (IT IS PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE) THAT
SOME
NATO AIR FORCES CARRY OUT CERTAIN TASKS WHICH, IN MOST PACT FORCES,
ARE
UNDERTAKEN BY ARMY PERSONNEL. THE WP HAVE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT, IN THE
PACT
FORCES, GDR AIR FORCE PERSONNEL MAN GROUND AIR DEFENCES.

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9. IF ALL THE ELEMENTS FALLING INTO THESE CATEGORIES (HELICOPTERS, SAM, SSM), ARE TAKEN IN, THE NATO AIR FORCE MANPOWER INVOLVED WOULD TOTAL 34,000. IN THE GDR FORCES, THE CORRESPONDING IDENTIFIED FIGURE WOULD BE ABOUT 11,000.

10. IF THESE AIR FORCE PERSONNEL ARE THEN ADDRESSED FOR REDUCTIONS, THE TOTALS WOULD BE:

	ARMY	AIR	TOTAL
NATO	798,000	34,000	832,000
WP	927,000	11,000	938,000

IF THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT AT 700,000 WERE MAINTAINED, THE RESULT AGAIN WOULD BE TO REDUCE THE ASYMMETRY IN REDUCTIONS AS ENVISAGED BY NATO IN THE "APPROACH TO NEGOTIATIONS" (1), THUS:

REDUCTIONS

INCL OF IDENTIFIED AND

C-M(73)83(FINAL) NEW COUNT QUALIFIED AIR ELEMENTS

31.12.73 WITH NEW COUNT

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NATO	77,000	98,000	132,000
WP	225,000	227,000	238,000\$\$
RATIO	3:1	2.3:1	1.9:1

\$\$THESE FIGURES MUST BE ADJUSTED TO THE EXTENT THAT WP AIR FORCE HELICOPTER AND SSM UNITS CAN BE IDENTIFIED AS BEING IN DIRECT SUPPORT OF THE ARMIES.

11. THE NET NUMERICAL RESULT WOULD STILL PLACE NATO MORE FAVOURABLE, IN TERMS OF CONFRONTATION IN PEACETIME, THAN IS CURRENTLY THE CASE. ESSENTIALLY, NATO WOULD HAVE MOVED SIGNIFICANTLY NEARER THE WARSAW PACT APPROACH ON TWO COUNTS:

A. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT THAT AIR FORCES AS WELL AS ARMIES SHOULD BE COUNTED AND ADDRESSED.

B. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT THAT THE ASYMMETRY IN NATO-PACT FORCES, COUNTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH A., IS LESS THAN NATO HAS CLAIMED: I.E. THAT THE "GROUND" FORCES ARE NEARER "BALANCE" THAN NATO HAS ADMITTED.

12. THE ADDITIONAL REDUCTIONS REQUIRED OF NATO COULD NOT BE BORNE WHOLLY, OR SUBSTANTIALLY, BY THE AIR FORCE PERSONNEL (34,000) INTRODUCED INTO THE EQUATION, AS THIS WOULD SERIOUSLY REDUCE NATO'S AIR DEFENCES--FOR SOME NATIONS ALMOST DENUDE THEM. AGAIN, AS DISCUSSED FOR ADDITIONAL GROUND FORCES AT PARAS 4-5 ABOVE, THE CUTS WOULD HAVE TO BE TAKEN MAINLY BY THE EXISTING NATO ARMIES. IF THE AIR FORCES TOOK THEIR SHARE AT 10 PERCENT (3,400), THE ARMIES WOULD HAVE TO BEAR A FURTHER REDUCTION OF PEACETIME STRENGTHS OF 30,000--THE MANPOWER EQUIVALENT OF NEARLY TWO DIVISIONS. IN AGGREGATE, REDUCTIONS COULD THUS EXCEED THE MANPOWER EQUIVALENT OF FIVE DIVISIONS. THE CRUCIAL MILITARY SECURITY ISSUES FOR NATO ARE--FIRST: WHETHER THE RESIDUAL GROUND FORCES, WITHIN THE COMMON CEILING, WILL PROVIDE A CREDIBLE AND EFFECTIVE FORWARD DEFENCE: AND WILL ENABLE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MC 14/3 STRATEGY,--AND SECOND, WHETHER THE REDUCED PEACETIME READY FORCES COULD BE EFFICIENT AND TRAINED, AND COULD BE AUGMENTED EFFICIENTLY AND FULLY WITHIN THE ASSESSED WARNING TIME, TO PROVIDE AN UNDIMINISHED RESPONSE TO WARSAW PACT ATTACK.

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13. IF THE ADDITIONAL GROUND PERSONNEL (AS AT THE 31.12.73 RECOUNT) AND THE ADDITIONAL AIR PERSONNEL (AS AT PARA 9 ABOVE) ARE ADDED TOGETHER, AND IF THE COMMON CEILING WERE MAINTAINED AT ABOUT 700,000, NATO WOULD REDUCE BY A TOTAL OF ABOUT 132,000, REDUCTIONS BEING BORNE VERY LARGELY BY THE GROUND FORCES--OR ABOUT 16.5 PERCENT OF NATO'S EXISTING GROUND FORCES (798,000). IT IS VERY IMPROBABLE THAT NATO COULD TOLERATE REDUCTIONS IN GROUND FORCES ON THIS SCALE AND STILL MAINTAIN THE STRATEGY OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE.

14. ON THE OTHER HAND, IT IS CLEAR FROM C-M(73)83(FINAL) THAT ALLIED AIR FORCES (PER SE) SHOULD NOT BE ADDRESSED IN MBFR, AND THAT REDUCTIONS IN GROUND FORCES SHOULD NOT EXCEED 10 PERCENT. IF, UNDER THIS APPROACH, THE ALLIES WERE TO CONCEDE THAT THE 34,000 NATO AIR FORCE PERSONNEL MENTIONED ABOVE SHOULD BE COUNTED TOWARDS GROUND FORCES (THUS INCREASING THE

TOTAL FIGURE TO 832,000) AND THAT THEY SHOULD BE ADDRESSED FOR REDUCTIONS, THE 10 PERCENT MAXIMUM REDUCTION COULD INVOLVE NATO IN REDUCTIONS OF AN ADDITIONAL 3,000 MEN. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THIS APPROACH WOULD INCLUDE ESTABLISHMENT OF A COMMON CEILING AT ABOUT 750,000, IF THE NATO ARMY PERSONNEL COUNT IS ACCEPTED AS 798,000. THE EFFECT OF THE ADDITIONAL REDUCTIONS UNDER THIS APPROACH (3,000 PERSONNEL) WOULD VARY, DEPENDING ON WHETHER AND HOW THE EXTRA REDUCTIONS WERE DISTRIBUTED AMONG ALLIED NATIONS AND BETWEEN ARMIES AND AIR FORCES. IF THE COMMON CEILING WERE TO BE, AS SEEMS LIKELY, ITSELF AN APPROXIMATION (E.G. ABOUT 750,000), THE 3,000 MEN INVOLVED COULD WELL BE ABSORBED INTO THE FLUCTUATION ROUND THAT APPROXIMATION WHICH WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY DEVELOP DURING NEGOTIATIONS. IF THIS EXTRA CUT OF 3,000 HAD TO BE BORNE IN FULL BY THE AIR ELEMENTS FROM WHICH IT DERIVES, DETAILED REVIEW OF THE EFFECTS OF SUCH A MANPOWER CUT FOR SPECIFIC UNITS WOULD BE NECESSARY, BEFORE EFFECTS COULD BE FORECAST.

AIR MANPOWER OVERALL

15. AS STATED ABOVE, THE USE TO WHICH THE AD HOC GROUP WILL PUT THE TOTAL AIR MANPOWER FIGURES HAS NOT BEEN DECIDED. IF IT WERE SIMPLY TO BE ADDED TO THE GROUND MANPOWER FIGURE ON BOTH SIDES, BOTH AT PRESENT LEVELS AND IN CALCULATION OF THE COMMON CEILING POST-REDUCTIONS, THERE WOULD BE NO CHANGE IN THE NATO CONCEPT

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OF MBFR.

16. DECLARATION OF THE AIR FORCE FIGURE WOULD OF COURSE (AS IT HAS FOR GROUND FORCES) OPEN THE WEST TO PROBING ON ITS CONTENT AND HOW THE FIGURES ARE REACHED. AS THE CHAIRMAN, MC, SAID, AT A RECENT MEETING OF COUNCIL, A MILITARY VIEW HAS BEEN REACHED ONLY ON ONE POSSIBLE OPTION INVOLVING AIR--THE THRID OPTION IN THE "US APPROACH TO MBFR", INVOLVING A MIXED PACKAGE DEAL. DETAILED STUDIES ON THE IMPLICATIONS OF OTHER AIR OPTIONS ARE NEARING FINALITY IN THE SUB-GROUP ON TAC AIR OF THE MBFR WORKING GROUP--A REPORT SHOULD BE FINALISED IN LATE JUNE. UNTIL THAT HAS STUDIED AT HIGHER LEVELS WE COULD NOT FORECAST THE MILITARY IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO OF ADDRESSING TACTICAL AIR FORCES IN MBFR.

END TEXT. RUMSFELD

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